Section 119: Interpretation of “charged” and “fair hearing within a reasonable

119. Interpretation of “charged” and “fair hearing within a reasonable time”—The accused was arrested on June 23, 1969, in connection with an offence of illicit distillation detected by the Police on the same day. The case was fixed to 24 June 1970, for the determination of a preliminary point to be raised by his Counsel. On 24 June, after hearing a police officer who gave evidence as to the delay in bringing the case to Court, the accused’s Counsel submitted that the prosecution of his client was time-barred by virtue of section 10 (1) of the Constitution as he had not been afforded a fair hearing within a reasonable time. The Court referred the matter to the Supreme Court. HELD (i) the word “charged” meant “arraigned before a Court of law by which the accused is to be tried”; (ii) it seemed, however, that undue delay in the institution of proceedings against an accused party may be a factor, viewed in the context of [Issue 1] CON – 198 Revised Laws of Mauritius the participation circumstances of each case, which a Court of trial was entitled to take into account when considering whether the delay had not had for effect to prevent the accused from having a fair trial. (iii) section 10 (1) of the Constitution does not provide that an information must be preferred within a reasonable delay; it provides that a person charged with a criminal offence must be afforded a fair hearing within a reasonable time; (iv) delay in the prosecution of offences, even when unreasonable, is not, by itself, repugnant to the concept of “fair hearing” in the context of the Constitution; such delay, by itself, will not make the hearing unfair; the hearing must be fair, having regard to the delay. Police v Labat (1970).