Section 136: Limitation of actions – Prescription—The plaintiff was injured in a car

136. Limitation of actions – Prescription—The plaintiff was injured in a car accident in July 1959. He applied for and obtained legal aid in October 1960. The statement of claim was, however, filed only in 1968. The case came for hearing on 2 December 1970. After the plaintiff’s evidence had been heard and his case closed, the proceedings were adjourned and a motion was filed by the defendant asking the Court to dismiss the plaintiff’s action for want of prosecution on the ground that he had been guilty of inordinate and inexcusable delay, both in the exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court of Justice in England and in the exercise of its duty and power under section 10 (8) of the Constitution to afford a fair hearing to parties in civil proceedings. HELD refusing the motion, (i) the rule of practice formulated and developed by the Courts in England, should be applied subject to the qualification that delay is a relevant consideration only when it has occurred after the issue of the originating process and in breach of some time limit fixed by Rules of Court or by an order of the Court; (ii) the principles underlying the requirements of a “fair hearing” in section 10 (8) of the Constitution are the same as those regulating prescription in the common law. The time limits fixed by that law with respect to the limitation of actions are, consequently, not inconsistent with the Constitution, and must be given effect to. The prescriptive period fixed by law had not run out in the present case and the plaintiff’s action was still competent. Hossen v Dhunny (1972).