Section 173:

173. Incitement to violence or disorder – Presumption of constitutionality— On the hearing of the appeal by way of case stated against dismissal on a charge of sedition, the question arose whether, in view of the judgment of this Court in Rex v Millien (1949) the law creating the offence was inconsistent with the Constitution, and therefore void, because it violated the fundamental right to freedom of expression protected by section 12 of the Constitution. HELD (i) if it were to give to section 283 of the PC the meaning given to it by the Judges who decided Millien’s case, it must come to the conclusion that the section was beyond the permissible limits of restrictions which the Legislature was empowered to impose under section 12 of the Constitution; (ii) section 283 PC was capable of 2 interpretations: one given to it in Millien’s case, and the other given to it in Levieux and anor v Rex (1911); (iii) incitement to disorder was an essential ingredient of the offence of sedition under the law of Mauritius; (iv) when a provision of law was capable of 2 interpretations, one of which made it constitutional, and the other unconstitutional, the interpretation that made it constitutional must be preferred; (v) the gist of the offence of sedition was “incitement to disorder or tendency or likelihood of public disorder or the reasonable apprehension thereof”; (vi) although motive could not by itself constitute an excuse for attempting to arouse feelings of ill-will and hostility, it must be considered to determine the question whether the accused party had the seditious intent. DPP v Masson and anor (1972).